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INTRODUCTION
In this Article I will reflect on the past twenty years of
trademark law and provide insight into the direction of the law as it
continues to evolve. The previous twenty years coincide with the
period that Hugh Hansen has so ably directed the Fordham
Intellectual Property Law and Policy Conference, the preeminent
conference of its kind in the world. In bringing together an
amazing mix of leading scholars and practitioners from the world
over, Professor Hansen has created a conference where one truly
learns, debates and has fun. To illustrate the trends of this period, I
have chosen ten cases as frames of reference. In this endeavor, I
have been greatly aided by the volumes published in conjunction
with the Fordham IP Conference. I can think of no better way to
track the changes that have occurred in the world of trademark and
other areas of intellectual property law than to consult these annual
publications.
Top ten lists are used to enumerate an individual’s favorite
books, movies and songs, but are also used by late night comedians
as a basis for ridicule. My ten-case collection is a combination of
the foregoing. My selections include not only positive examples of
well-crafted case law, but also cases that, in my opinion, were
decided incorrectly and are even subject to ridicule. On the whole,
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this subjective, certainly idiosyncratic choice of cases will reveal
that United States trademark law, despite perennial grumblings
from the academic community,1 has done a relatively successful
job in adjusting to practical realities that trademark owners and
consumers of brand-name goods face in an environment dominated
by the internet and global commerce.
In viewing these cases, I will attempt to predict the direction of
trademark law. In emulating a group of well-versed trademark
scholars, who met in Cannes, France in 1992 to speculate on what
trademark law would look like in 2017,2 I adopt a similar, but more
modest goal and constrain my predictions to the relatively
circumscribed. Of course, observing the past is an easier task than
speculating about the future, but the importance of the latter cannot
be overstated.
Since 1992, the increasing expansion of trademark rights has
continued unabated. Importantly, the attitude expressed by a large
majority of the bench and bar has taken a positive view of
trademark law as a system that enhances consumer welfare. In the
1960s and 1970s the anti-trademark sentiment viewed trademark as
a means for creating monopoly power in favor of the trademark
owner.3 According to this now generally outmoded view, the
trademark system reinforces irrational consumer demand through
artificial product differentiation and erects barriers to entry for
other firms that may wish to compete in the product market.4 As
one court declared, “the trademark is endowed with a sales appeal
independent of the quality or price of the product to which it is
attached; economically irrational elements are introduced into

1

There are many such articles written by my colleagues in academia, many of which
are well written and bring up important issues but are clearly of the somber, even
apocalyptic mode. See generally Ken Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008) (demonstrating how trademark owners are
increasingly using strike suits to deter market entry).
2
Symposium, The World in 2017, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 842 (1992).
3
I have elaborated the concept of monopoly phobia in Marshall Leaffer, Sixty Years
of the Lanham Act: The Decline and Demise of Monopoly Phobia, in U.S. INTELL. PROP.
LAW & POL’Y 85 (Hugh Hansen ed., 2005).
4
See e.g., A.G. Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. Rev.
503 (1956).
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consumer choices; and the trademark owner is insulated from the
normal pressures of price and quality competition.”5
This anti-trademark stance was not limited to the courts;
government policy toward trademarks expressed the same view.
Most conspicuously, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
considered compulsory licensing of trademarks as a means to
eliminate monopoly power in companies that enjoyed ownership of
strong marks.6 At that time, the FTC promoted governmental
intervention in circumstances in which trademarks and brand
promotion were thought to be a barrier to competition.
Trademark skepticism waned toward the end of the 1970s, but
continued until the passage of the Federal Anti-Dilution Act in
1996.7 Since the 1980s, the prevailing view believes in a strong
trademark system based on a property rights model—in short, the
protection of goodwill—that improves competition and consumer
welfare. One can look to three developments that progressively
led to doctrinal change in the law of trademarks. The first is “the
new economic learning,” which established the competitive
benefits of product differentiation and emphasized the fundamental
role of trademarks as a means of reducing search costs to the
consumer. The second impetus affected the manner in which
goods are sold in a global market place. A third stimulus for
change was the push toward harmonization of intellectual property
worldwide, as exhibited in the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement.8
Together, these
influences have led to an expanded concept of property rights in
trademark law based on the protection of goodwill embodied in the
trademark, and have all but eliminated the trademark monopoly
phobia. This property-rights oriented standard will shape the
future of trademark law.

5

Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1968).
See RICHARD CRASWELL, FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING,
TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER INFORMATION, AND BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 2 (1979); In re
Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978).
7
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
8
As part of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States was a major
promoter of the TRIPS agreement.
6
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Put yourself in the shoes of a trademark practitioner or scholar
in 1992. It was a different world then;9 one that was to change
radically through the TRIPS Agreement, a new dilution statute,
and the United States’ entry into the Madrid Protocol. Focusing on
my ten-case collection, I will illustrate the driving forces that
shaped trademark law and the remarkable developments that
occurred over this two-decade period, and speculate on what the
future might bring to this area of law.
NUMBER 10: THE EVER MORE COMPLICATED PREDICAMENT OF THE
TRADEMARK PRACTITIONER
In re Bose Corp.10
The job of a trademark practitioner has gotten progressively
more difficult during this twenty-year period. This change is
exemplified in the ballooning number of trademark applications
over the past twenty years. For example, in 1992 there were
125,237 applications for registration;11 in 2011, that number rose
to 398,667.12 During the same period, renewal applications rose
from 6,355 to 49,000.13 These statistics suggest that trademark
selection has become increasingly important and that successfully
clearing marks has never been more difficult. Further, they
demonstrate that simply keeping up with a multitude of
applications, registrations, and renewals in today’s world is a
daunting task, and one that is further compounded on an
international level.
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In
re Bose Corp., recognized the practical difficulties of those on the

9
There was concern about how to handle domain names. It was not until a few years
later that the Uniform Domain Name Dispute-Resolution Policy resolved that problem.
10
580 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
11
Table 16: Trademark Applications Filed for Registration and Renewal and
Trademark Affidavits Filed, USPTO.COM, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/
2007/50316_table16.html (last modified Dec. 21, 2007).
12
Table 17: Trademark Applications Filed for Registration and Renewal and
Trademark Affidavits Filed, USPTO.COM http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/
oai_05_wlt_17.html (last modified Jan. 3, 2012).
13
Id.
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front lines of trademark practice and conformed the standard for
fraud of the Trademark Office to the patent law standard for
inequitable conduct.14 In the case, Bose Corporation registered the
mark WAVE for various products including audio tape recorders
and players.15 Bose renewed the marks in 2001 for the same list of
products, although it had not sold audio tape recorders and players
since 1997.16 The court reiterated that “[a] third party may petition
to cancel a registered trademark on the grounds that the
‘registration was obtained fraudulently.’”17 In short, a “should
have known” standard for a false statement of fact in an
application is no longer sufficient to sustain a claim for fraud either
for a patent or a trademark filing.18 To succeed on a claim for
fraud, a litigant must show that the filed affidavit contained false
statements of material fact that were submitted with the intent to
deceive.19
The key question is: what one must prove to meet the
inequitable standard? Establishing falsity and materiality is
straightforward; however, the evidence required to show that a
statement was made with intent to deceive is far from apparent.
Does inequitable conduct exist where a person who makes a
statement later found to be false can show a reasonable, factual
basis for his or her belief that the statement is true? These
questions will plague the courts for some time to come. Despite
these problems of proof, the upshot of this case is that more
trademark attorneys will sleep soundly without having to worry
about a guileless mistake resulting in cancellation of a client’s
mark.

14
15
16
17
18
19

Bose, 580 F.3d at 1247.
See id. at 1242.
See id.
See id. at 1243 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006)).
See id. at 1245.
See id.
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NUMBER 9: WILL THE UNITED STATES EVER RECOGNIZE ITS
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE PARIS CONVENTION?
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini Inc.20
From its vigorous support of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)21 to
the current push in favor of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA),22 the United States has been at the forefront
of encouraging the effective protection of intellectual property
rights worldwide. This is hardly surprising since the United States
is the largest producer of informational assets in the world and has
reason to assure its citizens that those assets are protected abroad.
Using ITC v. Punchgini as my frame of reference, I will discuss a
departure from the general thrust of American policy in the
international protection of what one might call “its first world
assets.”23 I refer to the failure of United States law to create a
coherent policy to protect well-known marks despite its treaty
obligations under article 6bis of the Paris Convention.24
Introduced at the Hague conference of 1925 and elaborated by
TRIPS, article 6bis of the Paris Convention requires member
countries to protect marks that are well-known in a member
country. It is generally recognized that countries must do so even
though the well-known mark is neither registered nor used in the
protecting country.25 United States case law is in disarray on this
issue and, for the moment, there seems to be no interest to remedy

20

482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
22
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Final Draft, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Dec. 3, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/
intellectual-property/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-acta/previous-acta-texts.
23
Frederick M. Abbot, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in the Field of
TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 77, 80 (2005).
24
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
25
See id.
21
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the problem legislatively. Some courts believe that the current
provisions of the Lanham Act26 are sufficient to accommodate the
well-known marks doctrine, but most courts do not.
ITC v. Punchgini displays the exact problem mentioned above:
the failure of United States law to create a coherent policy in the
protection of well-known marks despite its treaty obligations under
article 6bis of the Paris Convention. In ITC, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s well-known mark for
restaurant services, BURKARA, was abandoned and could not be
enforced against the defendant’s similar mark, “Burkara Grill,”
despite its continued use in India and other countries.27 The Court
so ruled because neither the Paris Convention nor TRIPS is selfexecuting in the United States, and no well-known marks doctrine
had been enacted by Congress.28
Would it be too much to hope for an amendment to the Lanham
Act to take into account the protection of well-known marks as
compared to our major trading partners? At the least, other circuits
should follow the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Grupo Gigante v.
Dallo,29 which recognized the well-known marks doctrine in an
action under section 43(a).30 In this case, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the well-known marks doctrine as an application of
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.31 Grupo Gigante, a Mexican
Company, began operating a chain of supermarkets in Mexico
under the name “Gigante” in 1962, and by 1991 had 100 stores in

26

15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006).
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini Inc., 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007).
28
Id. at 165. Other courts within the Second Circuit have also rejected the view that
the well-known marks doctrine was incorporated by the Lanham Act. See Almacenes
Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that only Congress, and not the courts, can incorporate the well-known marks
doctrine into the Lanham Act); Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that no rights in the mark FASHION CAFÉ were created when an Italian
company advertised its restaurant in the United States). But see Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2005). There, the Second Circuit
expressly left open the possibility that protection would be available for well-known
foreign marks if they were “sufficiently famous.” See id. at 480–81.
29
391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
30
Id. at 1094.
31
Id.
27
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Mexico, six of them in Baja California (two in Tijuana).32 In 1991,
Dallo opened a grocery store in San Diego, California under the
name “Gigante Market.” From 1999 to 2000, Grupo Gigante
opened three stores in Los Angeles, California. Grupo Gigante
brought an action for infringement of its common law rights in the
United States under section 43(a). The court then faced two issues:
1) whether a foreign trademark owner can sustain a cause of action
in the United States as an exception to the territoriality principle;33
and 2) if so, what degree of renown must be shown to sustain a
cause of action under section 43(a)?34 The court declared that
territoriality in trademark law is not absolute and when a mark
reaches a certain exceptional level of notoriety overseas, the
territorial principle can be overcome.35 In order to qualify for an
exception to the territoriality principle, the foreign user must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial
percentage of consumers in the relevant United States market are
familiar with the foreign mark.36 The court based its decision on
an interpretation of the Lanham Act, and rejected Grupo Gigante’s
specific claims under the well-known marks doctrine of 6bis and
unfair competition of 10bis of the Paris Convention.37
The Grupo Gigante court took the right approach to the
problem and its opinion should be the template for future decisions
applying the well-known marks doctrine. After all, one must take
the territoriality principle with a grain of salt. Despite its long
standing recognition, the territoriality doctrine has never existed in
a pure state, and has continued to give way in this twenty-year
period as commerce and brand names continue to expand across
national boundaries in a world structured by air travel, satellites,
the internet, and the influx of immigrants into the United States.

32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
See id. at 1094.
See id. at 1098.
See id. at 1099–1100.
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NUMBER 8: EXPANDING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
U.S. TRADEMARK LAW
McBee v. Delica Co.38
McBee, chosen as case number eight on the list, stands for an
even broader extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. There,
Cecil McBee was unable to enforce his rights against the use of his
mark by a Japanese company selling girls clothing on the
company’s Japanese language website. More significantly the
court adopted the Supreme Court’s standard as applied in the
extraterritorial application of antitrust law in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California.39 In Hartford, the Court modified preestablished precedent on the extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act. The Court restated the well-established principle
that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct “that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States.”40 The Court specified that Congress voiced no
opinion on the issue “whether a court with Sherman Act
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on
grounds of international comity.”41 Although the term “comity”
was not at issue in this case, the court rejected the application of
comity as being jurisdictional.42
McBee extends Hartford to the extraterritorial application of
trademark law. Simply put, jurisdiction over foreign conduct will
exist under the Lanham Act if that conduct produced some
substantial effect in the United States.43 Moreover, once the
substantial effect test is met, the court is to consider the question of
comity as a prudential—not a jurisdictional—question of whether
jurisdiction should be exercised. With this holding, the court
shunted to one side both Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,44 and Vanity

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

417 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005).
509 U.S. 764 (1993).
Id. at 796.
Id. at 798.
See id.
See id. at 796.
344 U.S. 280 (1952).
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Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.45 McBee is a significant case in
articulating a more expansive standard for the extraterritorial
application of the Lanham Act, an approach that I believe is welljustified. The intense flow of Internet commerce, unlike the reach
of commerce twenty years ago, warrants a more expansive
extraterritorial reach of United States trademark law.
However, critics of this expansive extraterritorial application of
United States trademark law warn against U.S. federal courts
assuming the role of “the global court of commerce.”46 On the
other hand, McBee acknowledges that Congress has little concern
in applying United States trademark law where no substantial
effects are felt in the United States. Only when a substantial effect
is felt in the United States may a court assert jurisdiction.47 Until
foreign nations provide necessary protections through regulation
and enforcement, far-reaching extraterritorial enforcement is
necessary to prevent violators from “hid[ing] in countries without
efficacious . . . trademark laws, thereby avoiding legal authority.”48
Yet this is a doctrine that is still circumscribed by comity even
when a substantial effect is felt in the Unites States, and the
extraterritorial application of United States law must give way
when true conflict between domestic and foreign law exists. Here,
courts may use comity considerations as a means to decline to
exercise jurisdiction.49

45

234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). In following the lead of Steele v. Bulova, the court in
Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co. articulated a tripartite test for the extraterritorial
application of U.S. trademark law: “(1) the defendant’s conduct had a substantial effect
on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was a United States citizen and the United
States has a broad power to regulate the conduct of its U.S. citizens in foreign countries;
and (3) there was no conflict with trademark rights established under the foreign law,
since the defendant’s Mexican registration had been canceled by proceedings in Mexico.”
Id. at 642. The court denied jurisdiction in Vanity Fair Mills because only the first factor
was present in the case. See id.
46
4 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, § 29:58.
47
See Brendan J. Witherell, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham
Act—The First Circuit Cuts the Fat from the Vanity Fair Test, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
193, 228 (2006).
48
McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 119 (1st Cir. 2005).
49
Id. at 120 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993)).
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NUMBER 7: BOUNDARY TENSIONS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIMES
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox50
The boundaries between trademark law and other intellectual
property regimes are becoming less distinct and the same
trademark-based cause of action will lend itself to multiple claims
including copyright, patent, and various state causes of action. It
has always been this way as litigants, for strategic and other
purposes, try to enlarge the scope of liability. I believe these
overlaps in intellectual property rights are a function both of the
expanding subject matter scope of trademark law and of the
application of likelihood of confusion concepts beyond the pointof-sale 51
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,52 case
number seven on the list, represents the inevitable tension that
occurs as the scope of intellectual property rights progressively
broadens. There, Dastar released a World War II television series
consisting largely of footage which was originally produced by a
Fox affiliate and which had fallen into the public domain.53 Fox
and its affiliates brought an action under the Lanham Act section
43(a) on a reverse passing off theory54 for failure of the defendant
to provide proper credit to the creator of the series.55 In finding for
Dastar, the Court noted that if Dastar had bought the videotapes
and then repackaged and sold them under its name, Fox’s claim
undoubtedly would be sustained.56 But here, Justice Scalia pointed
out that Dastar took a creative work in the public domain, copied

50

539 U.S. 23 (2003).
For an overview of the “likelihood of confusion” doctrine and the various non-point
of sale confusion theories, see Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson Lalonde, The Lanham Act:
Time for a Face Lift?, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1013 (2002).
52
539 U.S. 23 (2003).
53
Id. at 23.
54
Passing off would occur when X places the Coke label on its non-Coke beverage.
Reverse passing off occurs when X takes off the Coke label and replaces it with its own
mark.
55
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 23.
56
Id. at 23–24.
51
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it, modified it, and produced its own series of videotapes.57 In
effect, according to the Court, a false designation of origin under
the Lanham Act did not occur because Dastar was the “origin” of
the goods under the language of the statute.58 While section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act prohibits actions that deceive consumers,59 it
did not occur here. “The words of the Lanham Act should not be
stretched to cover matters that are typically of no consequence to
purchasers,” the court stated.60 Dastar’s importance lies in its
minor upheaval of the scope of the Lanham Act to cover certain
applications of the reverse confusion doctrine, such as the failure
to properly provide artistic credit.
Dastar’s ramifications, however, were felt well beyond the
immediate concerns of trademark law’s doctrine of reverse passing
off. For example, when the United States joined the Berne
Convention in March 1989, it did so without explicitly revising its
copyright law to incorporate article 6bis of the Convention—the
famous moral rights provision that was a major hurdle of United
States participation in the Convention.61 Moral rights are a
57

Id. at 24.
Id.
59
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
60
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33.
61
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis (Sept.
9, 1886; revised July 24, 1971 and amended 1979; entered into force for U.S. Mar. 1,
1989 (Sen. Treaty Doc. 99-27)) 1986 U.S.T. Lexis 160 or 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715. Article 6bis
reads:
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right
to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable
by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed. However, those countries
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after
the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his
death, cease to be maintained.
58
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centerpiece of legal regimes that view a work of authorship as an
extension of the author’s personality. The right of attribution is
one of the author’s rights referred to as “moral rights” or droit
moral.62 Accurate attribution, the right to be recognized as the
author of a work, performs a trademark-like function in identifying
both the source and the qualities of a work.63 The problem is that
United States copyright law does not explicitly recognize a general
right of attribution.64 To justify the entry of the United States into
the Berne Convention, advocates of Berne membership argued that
even though copyright law might fall short of fully recognizing
aspects of the moral right, other areas of the law, notably
trademark and unfair competition law, provided de facto
protection. Indeed, a number of cases have applied the reverse
confusion doctrine to provide de facto protection of the attribution
right.65 In Dastar, the United States Supreme Court threw into
doubt the underlying rationale that the United States had
incorporated specific recognition of the attribution right in
copyright law to comply with Berne requirements. Courts will be
working out these issues relating to the more unconventional
applications of section 43(a), such as the outer limits of the reverse
confusion doctrine, for some time to come.

Id.
62

See Betsey Rosenblatt, Moral Rights Basics (March 1998), http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/property/library/moralprimer.html.
63
The United States did not have any express protection for a right of attribution until
the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”). See 17 U.S.C. § 106A
(2006). For an overview of VARA and the attribution right, see Michael Landau, Dastar
v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights In the
United States, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273 (2005).
64
Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (Oct. 24, 1996),
available at http://www.copyright. gov/reports/exsum.html.
65
See, e.g., PPX Enters. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(promoting the recordings of a band in which Jimi Hendrix was just a background
musician was a 43(a) violation); Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp.
516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Follett v. Arbor House Pub. Co., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(holding that Lanham Act, section 43(a) was violated where author’s name appears as
primary author on book he did not write).
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NUMBER 6: THE NEED FOR A TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR FOR
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS
Tiffany v. eBay Inc.66
An online service provider (OSP) operates in a risky legal
environment and is subject to potentially unlimited claims of both
direct and contributory infringement by aggrieved copyright and
trademark owners.67 OSPs are given special recognition under
section 512 of the Copyright Act that erects a system of safe
harbors if certain conditions are met by the OSP.68 Third party
liability in trademark law is based on common law principles
developed in the physical world in cases such as Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.69 I have chosen
Tiffany v. eBay70 to illustrate the dilemma of the OSP in an action
for contributory trademark infringement in the World Wide Web
internet environment. Tiffany noticed that a large number of
Tiffany products offered for sale on the eBay website were
counterfeit.71 Tiffany sued eBay under a number of theories, one
of which was contributory infringement.72 Tiffany argued that
eBay had a general awareness that the auction items posted as
Tiffany jewelry were likely to be counterfeit, and, as a result, eBay
bore the duty to prevent the sale of these bogus products.73 In
affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of eBay, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit defined the “two ways in which a
defendant may become contributorially liable for the infringing
conduct of another: first, if the service provider ‘intentionally
induces another to infringe a trademark,’ and second, if the service
66

Tiffany (NJ) Inc., v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., id.
68
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
69
456 U.S. 844 (1982). The Court articulated the standard of contributory
infringement as follows: “Thus if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces
another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.” Id. at
854.
70
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
71
See id. at 97.
72
Id. at 103.
73
Id. at 106.
67
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provider ‘continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.’”74
Here, inducement was not an issue and the court rejected the
argument that contributory infringement could be based on the fact
that eBay had only generalized knowledge of some counterfeit
goods being listed on its website.75
The court held that “[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is
necessary” for liability under a cause of action for contributory
infringement.76 eBay, according to the court, must have had
“[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which listings are infringing
or will infringe in the future.”77 In this situation, Tiffany’s demand
letters were not sufficiently precise, and those that did contain
detailed information of the counterfeit sales were honored by eBay.
Tiffany is not a total win for OSPs when one considers the
court’s standard for liability in the case of “willful blindness.”
When an OSP has reason to suspect “that users of its service are
infringing a protected mark it may not shield itself from learning of
the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.”78
The problem with this willful blindness standard is that it fails to
specify the basis as to what constitutes “reason to suspect” that
users are infringing. In this case eBay prevailed, but OSPs will be
pursued with increasing intensity under third party liability claims
for contributory infringement for the foreseeable future. There is a
paucity of decisions dealing with third party liability in the use of
trademarks in an Internet context, which is likely to change.
Because eBay is one the first major decisions on this issue, we
need a safe harbor provision in trademark law much like section
512 of the Copyright Act.79

74

Id. (citing Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854).
Id. at 107.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 109.
79
See Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory
Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Problem,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 911 (2005).
75
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NUMBER 5: THE MUDDLED MESS OF DILUTION LAW
V Secret Catalogue Inc. v. Moseley80
The federal dilution cause of action is a major development in
trademark law of the last twenty years, with the first version of the
1995 dilution statute widely considered a mess. The 1995 version
of section 43(c) provided that the owner a famous mark was
entitled to injunctive relief against another person’s commercial
use of a mark or trade name if that use “causes dilution of the
distinctive quality” of the famous mark. Courts were split over
whether that language created a likelihood of dilution standard or
an actual dilution standard. The ruling in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc.81 resolved the split by finding that section 43(c)
required a showing of “actual dilution.” Unfortunately, the court
gave little guidance of what would constitute actual dilution.
There are a lot of problems with the dilution cause of action but the
Supreme Court’s opinion rendered another level of complexity to
this problematical cause of action. United States Congress
responded to V Secret Catalogue with surprising alacrity, and its
most prominent change required that dilution liability follow from
a showing of likelihood of dilution. The 2006 amendments to the
dilution provisions were a necessary improvement, but
fundamental questions of proof of dilution by blurring and
tarnishment continue to plague the courts.
I have chosen the Sixth Circuit case V Secret Catalogue v.
Mosley82 to illustrate the muddle we find ourselves in when
developing consistent rules for trademark dilution. In fact, I
believe that the majority opinion in this case is clearly wrong. This
case is part of the continuing saga of Victoria’s Secret, the famous
lingerie store, against a small-town retail store based in Kentucky
that sold sex-related products. The district court found that even
though the parties did not compete in the same market, the
Kentucky sex shop had diminished the positive associations and
the selling power of the Victoria’s Secret mark.83
80
81
82
83

V Secret Catalogue Inc., v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010).
537 U.S. 418 (2003).
605 F.3d 382.
Id. at 384–85.
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the
activities of the defendant constituted actionable dilution by
tarnishment.84 The court concluded that the 2006 Act “creates a
kind of rebuttable presumption, or at a least a very strong
inference, that a new mark used to sell sex-related products is
likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic
association between the two.”85
The court ruled that there is a strong inference that the mark
“Victor’s Little Secret” was likely to tarnish the famous “Victoria’s
Secret” mark because of a semantic association between the two
marks.86 But most importantly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the novelty shop failed to rebut the probability that some
consumers would find the shop’s mark both offensive and harmful
to the reputation and the favorable symbolism associated with
Victoria Secret’s mark.87 The court’s decision that any sexual
connotation disparages a famous mark and creates a rebuttable
presumption of dilution is nowhere to be found in the statute and
is, in my opinion, downright wrong as a matter of law. V Secret
Catalogue does not augur well for the predictability of a dilution
cause of action.
Now scholars might ask, “will we need another amendment to
the dilution provisions?” Perhaps, but for the moment there are no
burning issues that need emergency attention. On the other hand,
many basic questions that involve the proof of factual matters as
the multifactor test to prove fame88 and blurring89 will generate
substantial litigation.

84

See id. at 389; see also 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006) (“For purposes of
paragraph (1), “dilution by tarnishment” is association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous
mark.”).
85
V Secret Catalogue, 605 F.3d at 385.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 388–89.
88
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“For purposes of paragraph (1), a mark is famous if
it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner. In determining
whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all
relevant factors, including the following:
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NUMBER 4: THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF DEFENSES TO AN ACTION FOR
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Louis Vuitton v. Haute Diggity Dog LLC90
To establish liability for trademark infringement, the owner of
a mark must demonstrate that the third party use of his mark is
actionable under the Lanham Act.91 Not all unauthorized uses of
another’s mark are actionable under a cause of action for dilution
or likelihood of confusion. One such category of permissible use
falls under the term “fair use,” an imprecise catch-all term for a
variety of related doctrines. Fair use as a defense is specifically
recognized in section 1115(b)(4),92 which provides a fair use
defense to a party whose “use of the . . . term . . . charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term . . .

(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner
or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or
services offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.”).
89
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (“For purposes of paragraph (1), “dilution by
blurring” is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark. In determining
whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may
consider all relevant factors, including the following:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous
mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in
substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an
association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark.”).
90
Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir.
2007).
91
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
92
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006).
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which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services.”93 In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.
v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,94 the owner of the incontestable
trademark MICRO COLORS, which is used to describe a
permanent mark-up pigment, sued Lasting for its use of
“microcolors” on a similar product. The court held that the
plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable mark must
show likelihood of consumer confusion as part of the prima facie
case.95 Once confusion is shown, defendant may then assert that
the mark was used fairly under the statutory definition.
KP Permanent is a revealing case that shows the difficulty in
reconciling the issue of consumer confusion with the need of third
parties to reference the plaintiff’s mark. In my opinion, KP
Permanent is a case that establishes an ambiguous message in
trademark law; specifically, on the one hand, it rejected the
proposition that a fair use proponent prove absence of likelihood of
confusion, and on the other hand, the court refused to hold that
likelihood of confusion is irrelevant to the fair use defense. We
find this type of tension running prevalently throughout the
assertion of affirmative defenses to action for trademark
infringement.
I have chosen Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC as case number four because it represents one of several
cases that tackle the thorny question of defenses and other
limitations to a cause of action in dilution.96 In particular, Vuitton
is useful in illustrating the role of parody in both an action for
likelihood of confusion and also for a cause of action in dilution.
In this case, the Nevada-based company Haute Diggity Dog sold a
line of pet chew toys and beds under various amusing names such
as “Chewy Vuitton.”97 Vuitton sued Haute Diggity Dog under
various claims including an action for likelihood of confusion and

93

Id.
543 U.S. 111 (2004).
95
Id. at 112.
96
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 258 (4th Cir.
2007).
97
Id. at 256.
94
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dilution.98 In regards to likelihood of confusion claim, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s
assessment that because the “Chewy Vuitton” line of chew toys
successfully parodied the famous luxury handbag brand, no
likelihood of confusion existed as a matter of law.99 The court
concluded that the likelihood of confusion factors favored the
defendant and that the “Chewy Vuitton” dog toys conveyed “just
enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate
the point of the parody.”100
The plaintiff fared no better in its dilution claim. To determine
whether a junior mark is likely to dilute a famous mark through
blurring, the statute enumerates six factors that the court must take
into account.101 Here the court found that three of those factors
favored the plaintiff, including: (2) the strength of Vuitton’s mark;
(3) the substantially exclusive use of the Vuitton mark; and (4) the
renown of the Vuitton mark all favored plaintiff.102 On the other
hand, factors (1) the similarity between the marks; (5) the intent of
the use by the junior user; and (6) actual association, favored the
defendant.103 In finding for the defendant, the court emphasized
the use of parody, which negated the blurring action.104
The court did not apply parody as an affirmative defense,
which is specifically incorporated into section 43(c).105 Under the
statute, the dilution cause of action is excluded when a mark is
used in “any fair use . . . of a famous mark by another person other
than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or
services, including use in connection with . . . identifying,
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark.”106 Section
43(c)(3)(A) shields a defendant’s fair use, but only where the
defendant is using the mark “other than as a designation of
source.” Yet, the Vuitton court concluded that the defendant’s use
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id. at 256–57.
Id. at 261.
See supra note 89 (listing the six factors).
Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 266.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 266.
15 U.S.C. § 43(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2006).
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of the famous mark failed to satisfy that limitation.107 Although
the court did not employ parody as a fair use defense, it constantly
alluded to parody as an element that disproved the likelihood of
dilution.108 In applying the dilution factors, the court found that
even though the defendant’s mark was used on related goods, the
mark, when used as a parody, may be good evidence in negating a
cause of action of dilution by blurring.109
As I stated above, the courts have had a problem with relating
permissible use doctrines—such as parody and other varieties of
fair use—with doctrines of confusion and dilution. In Vuitton, the
court was willing to use parody as a threshold consideration in
both the consumer confusion and dilution analyses, which I view
as the court’s willingness to act as a harbinger for a broader
acceptance of permissible uses in trademark law. I predict that
permissible uses and defenses will play a greater role in the future,
and in particular, provide the needed safety valve against the
imperialism of unbridled dilution causes of action.110
NUMBER 3: TRADEMARKS ON THE INTERNET—THE NEW REALISM
Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts111
In 1992, less than two percent of the United States’ population
habitually used the Internet; today that number approaches eighty
percent.112 The average Internet user is increasingly savvy in online consumer transactions. The case law has progressively
reflected the evolution in our thinking by recognizing the realities
107

Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 268.
Id. at 268.
109
Id.
110
See e.g., Mattel, Inc.. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1171 (2003) (holding the song title “Barbie Girl” in song did not
mislead as to source under section 43(a) where a title has artistic relevance to the
underlying work and that the song title fell within the non-commercial liability
exemption to dilution under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act).
111
Network Automation Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2011).
112
See Internet Users as a Percentage of the Population, WORLD BANK data
republished at http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_
y=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:USA&dl=en&hl=en&q=internet+usage+statistics.
108
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of consumer behavior in the online Internet environment. By
comparison, Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp.113 mirrored an earlier view of naïve
consumers bewitched by the new Internet medium. For example,
in Brookfield the court declared that, “[i]n the internet context . . .
entering a web site takes little effort . . . thus web surfers are more
likely to be confused as to the ownership of a [w]eb site than
traditional patrons of a brick and mortar store.”114 And the court
spun a theory of initial interest confusion by using a dubious
analogy to the physical world: “using another’s trademark . . . is
much like posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s
store.”115
In addition, the court declared that in proving likelihood of
confusion on the Internet, the first three factors previously
mentioned (which came to be known as the Internet troika)116 of
the Sleekcraft117 test were the most important factors for proving
likelihood of confusion on the internet. These factors are: (1) the
similarity of the marks; (2) the relatedness of the goods or services;
and (3) the simultaneous use of the World Wide Web as a
marketing channel, to be taken into account for any case
addressing trademark infringement on the Internet.118 It later
became apparent that the courts should not inflexibly enshrine
three likelihood of confusion factors for all infringements taking
place in an internet context. In sum, case law in the 1990s created
a curious set of legal principles based on assumptions about the
online marketplace that no longer exists, or possibly never did.
Clearly, it was time for a reassessment more consistent with actual
practice.
113

174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
Brookfield, 174 F.3d 1036 at 1057.
115
Id. at 1064.
116
See id. at 1067 n.16.
117
See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979) for the
Ninth Circuit’s multifactor test. The likelihood of confusion test considers the following
factors: 1) similarity of the marks; 2) relatedness of the goods and services offered; 3)
overlapping marketing and advertising facilities; 4) the strength of the registered
trademark; 5) intent; 6) evidence of actual confusion; 7) likelihood of expansion in
product lines; and 8) purchaser care. See id.
118
See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1067 n.16 (stating the importance and reason behind
starting the analysis with these three factors).
114
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Much has changed since Brookfield. This evolution in thinking
about trademark law and the internet is illustrated by the case I
consider third most significant: Network Automation, Inc. v.
Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.119 Network Automation involved
a claim of likelihood of confusion in a Google AdWords context—
the acquisition of a competitor’s trademark as trigger for its search
engine advertisements. The court, in vacating a preliminary
injunction, emphasized that the Brookfield Internet troika factors
are not necessarily the factors most important to every case
involving likelihood of confusion on the Internet.120 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals also differed with Brookfield on Internet
consumer behavior, stating that “the default degree of consumer
care is becoming more heightened as the novelty of the internet
evaporates and online commerce becomes commonplace.”121
Network Automation is one of several cases recognizing the real
world of Internet marketing and the increasing sophistication of
consumers in their online activities.
As Judge Kosinski
summarized in Toyota Motor Sales v. Tabari:
[I]n the age of FIOS, cable modems, DSL and T1
lines, reasonable, prudent and experienced internet
consumers are accustomed to such exploration by
trial and error. They skip from site to site, ready to
hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied
with a site’s contents. They fully expect to find
some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a
glance at the domain name or search engine
summary. Outside the special case of . . . domains
that actively claim affiliation with the trademark
holder, consumers don’t form any firm expectations
about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve
seen the landing page—if then.122

119

638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).
“Given the multifaceted nature of the Internet and the ever-expanding ways in which
we all use the technology, however, it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors
for every type of potential online commercial activity.” Id. at 1148.
121
Id. at 1152.
122
610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010).
120
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More realistic notions of the reasonably prudent purchaser on
the Internet marketplace are finally being given recognition in the
courts. Much as in copyright law, the way the courts have reacted
to changing technological trends in trademark law illustrates once
again that legal change lags behind social change.
NUMBER 2: OF TRADE DRESS AND PRODUCT CONFIGURATION AND
OTHER NON-VERBAL MARKS
Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, Inc.123
The variety of non-verbal trademarks acknowledged by the
courts and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has
continued to enlarge during the twenty-year time frame covered in
this retrospective. Logos and packaging have long been protected
under trademark and unfair competition law. But in the last two
decades the courts and the PTO have also recognized and protected
color, product designs, fragrances, and other symbols. This
expansion of trademark law into more non-traditional subject
matter reflects, I believe, the changing nature of how consumers
have come to identify and distinguish a product by its form and
packaging. As Graeme Dinwoodie has pointed out, “Courts have
protected as trade dress the design features of an extensive range of
products including kitchen appliances, sporting equipment,
candies, bathroom fittings, sports cars, giant gumball machines,
furniture, hardware items, fashion accessories, lamps and even golf
holes.”124 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has served as the
statutory medium for this broad expansion of trademark subject
matter under the rubric of “trade dress,” a term used to refer to
product packaging in its multitudinous forms. 125
123

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
Graeme Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: a Teleological Approach to Trademark
Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 622 (1999) (collecting cases).
125
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides: “(a) Civil action (1) Any person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
124
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In 1992, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.126 was fresh on
everybody’s mind as a case that significantly enlarged the scope of
protection for trade dress. Taco Cabana operated a chain of
Mexican restaurants, and described its trade dress as “a festive
eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio area decorated
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings, and murals.”127 Taco
Cabana brought suit against Two Pesos under section 43(a) for
infringement of its trade dress. The question before the court was
whether trade dress could be protected absent secondary
meaning.128 In Two Pesos, the Court held that proof of secondary
meaning is not required to prevail on a claim under section 43(a)
where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive.129 By
allowing trade dress to be protected without a secondary meaning
filter, the risk of overprotecting an amorphous category of
trademark subject of indeterminate boundaries was created.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co. Inc. recognized the
necessity for some restraint on the ever-expanding contours of
trademark subject matter. 130 There, the court held that color alone
can meet the basic requirements as a trademark and can serve as a

person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
126
505 U.S. 763 (1992).
127
Id. at 765 (citing Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117
(5th Cir. 1991)).
128
Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or dress “has come
through use to be uniquely associated with a specific source.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13, cmt b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1990). “To establish secondary
meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather
than the product itself.” Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U. S.
844, 851 n.11 (1982).
129
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776.
130
514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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symbol that identifies and distinguishes a firm’s goods so long as
that color has attained a secondary meaning.131
I have chosen Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers as case
number two on this list because of the increasing importance of the
protection of trade dress and product design (and other nontraditional trademarks) under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In
Wal-Mart, by distinguishing product design from trade dress and
packaging, the Court cut back on the progressive broadening of
rights in this domain. Specifically, Samara Brothers brought suit
under section 43(a) for the imitation of its line of children’s
clothing consisting of seersucker fabric and gold appliqués. The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Samara, whose
product design was deemed protectable as being inherently
distinctive even though it had not attained a secondary meaning.
The Court ruled that product design, like product color, is not
capable of being inherently distinctive. The point is that product
design (unlike trade dress/packaging) serves purposes other than
source identification. Thus, allowing product design to be
protected without proof of secondary meaning would harm to
consumer interests. The Court rejected the application of an
inherent distinctiveness test for product design, stating that “such a
test would rarely provide the basis for summary disposition of an
anticompetitive strike suit.”132
The Court added that
“[c]ompetition is deterred . . . not merely by successful suit but the
plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of
inherently source identifying design, the game of allowing suit
based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth
the candle.”133
But Wal-Mart did not tie up all the loose ends. One thorny
question that has plagued the courts is the distinction between trade
dress/packaging and product design. Wal-Mart can be read in
conjunction with Qualitex v. Jacobsen, Dastar, and Traffix as
Supreme Court cases that attempt to strike a balance between third
party competitive entry into markets, and the protection of a

131
132
133

Id. at 174.
Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
Id.
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trademark owner’s goodwill. This is a difficult task, but one that
will always occupy the courts. I believe, however, that the courts
have properly struck the balance in favor of competitive entry,
absent a showing of secondary meaning on the part of the owner of
a non-verbal, non-traditional trademark.
NUMBER 1: TRYING TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF THE FUNCTIONALITY
DOCTRINE
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc.134
One who seeks to register and protect a product or container
configuration as a trademark must prove that its design is “nonfunctional and that the design is distinctive.”135 As recently
discussed in Samara, certain forms of trade dress—packaging—
can be protected as inherently distinctive without proof of
secondary meaning under the appropriate circumstances. The
second important step in determining product and trade dress is the
doctrine of functionality. In Qualitex v. Jacobsen Products, the
Supreme Court explained the functionality doctrine in the
following manner:
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law,
which seeks to promote competition by protecting a
firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate
competition by allowing a producer to control a
useful product feature. It is the province of patent
law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by
granting inventors a monopoly over new product
designs or functions for a limited time . . . after
which competitors are free to use the innovation. If
a product’s functional features could be used as
trademarks, however, a monopoly over such
features could be obtained without regard to
whether they qualify as patents and could be

134
135

532 U.S. 23 (2001).
In re Morton-Norwich Products Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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extended forever (because trademarks may be
renewed in perpetuity).136
Before the TrafFix decision in 2001, the courts had developed a
practical standard for determining functionality based on whether
the product feature was needed in order to compete.137 The
functionality doctrine was best articulated in In re Morton-Norwich
Products, Inc.138 In this case, Judge Rich listed four evidentiary
criteria to determine whether a product feature is de jure
functional: (1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the
utilitarian advantages of the design; (2) advertising materials in
which the originator of the design touts the design’s utilitarian
advantages; (3) the availability to competitors of functionally
equivalent designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design results
in a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the
product.139
I have chosen TrafFix as my number one case for essentially
negative reasons. I have come to intensely dislike this case not so
much for the Court’s perhaps well-intentioned goal to render some
certainty to the functionality doctrine, but instead for the
unintelligible, incoherent way the Court went about its task. The
doctrine of functionality was already one of the most challenging
and befuddling doctrines in trademark law even before the
Supreme Court added another layer of needless confusion in
TrafFix.
In TrafFix, the Court ruled that the respondent’s trade dress on
a spring mounted wind resistant sign stand, which was used in
traffic control and construction work zones, was functional.140
What is puzzling is not the actual decision but how the Court
imposed a new “bright line” rule in determining the issue of

136

Qualitex v. Jacobsen Products, 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995).
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17 (1995) (“A design . . . is
‘functional’ if the particular design affords benefits to the person marketing the goods or
services, apart from any benefits attributable to the design’s significance as an indication
of source, that are important to effective competition by others and that are unavailable
through the use of alternative designs.”).
138
See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A 1982).
139
Id. at 1340–41.
140
TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Mktg. Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001).
137
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functionality. Even before defining the functionality standard, the
TrafFix Court was eager to establish a new bright line rule to
determine functionality based on the presence of a utility patent.
The Court held that “[a] utility patent is strong evidence that the
features therein claimed are functional. If trade dress protection is
sought for those feature the strong evidence of functionality based
on the previous patent adds great weight to the statutory
presumption that features are deemed functional until proved
otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection.”141
The problem with the Court’s approach in this case is that it
seems to overemphasize the presence of a utility patent in the
analysis of functionality. Ultimately, the determination should be
based on a competitive need, and the presence of a utility patent,
by itself, provides no evidence of the competitive significance of
the features claimed. Patents are sometimes granted for obscure
inventions of non-existent commercial value. Other patents are
allowed for slight advances over the prior art and are narrow in
scope. In addition, many patents lapse, sometimes abandoned by
their owners for failure to pay periodically required maintenance
fees before their expiration dates. In placing the mere presence of
a patent as the centerpiece in the analysis of functionality, the court
misses the important policy reason for the doctrine—one that is
based on competitive need. The presence of a patent may or may
not be important in determining circumstantial functionality, but it
still should not be used as a bright line rule. Despite this point, the
court continues to argue this fact in a totally aberrant manner, and
whether satisfactory alternatives exist is not relevant to the
discussion.142
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in TrafFix to resolve a
minor split in circuits involving the relevance of an expired utility
patent on the issue of functionally, yet ultimately ended up
rewriting the entire law of functionality in an incoherent manner.143
141

Id. at 29–30.
See id. at 33–34.
143
Compare Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that trade dress protection is not foreclosed by utility patent); Thomas & Betts
Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); and Midwest Indus., Inc. v.
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (same), with Vornado Air
142
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In so doing, it jettisoned the uniform use of a competitive need
functionality standard, and ditched the consistent treatment of all
functionality questions, whether aesthetic or utilitarian.144 In sum,
the court rendered an inherently difficult doctrine that was more
perplexing, less intelligible, and less predictable than the
original.145 The mischief of TrafFix can be found in the muddled
post-TrafFix case law, and it will take a long time to undo the
confusion created by this poorly crafted decision.146
For some time now, a number of scholars have addressed the
issue of functionality in academic literature. What is remarkable
about the discussion is that after all the many years of discussion,
hardly any consensus has developed on the doctrine of
functionality. During the twenty years of this retrospective,
scholars and courts differ on its underlying rationale and scope. In
the future, they should focus on a uniform coherent practical test to
prove functionality in the litigation process, one that supports its
underlying competitive market rationale.
CONCLUSION
In adapting to a new marketing environment, trademark law
has seen more change in the last twenty years than in any time in
its history. These ten cases were chosen as vehicles to illustrate
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Where a
product configuration is a significant inventive component of an invention covered by a
utility patent . . . it cannot receive trade dress protection . . . .”).
144
TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. It is proper to inquire into a “significant non-reputationrelated disadvantage” in cases of aesthetic functionality, the question involved in TrafFix.
Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation there is no need to proceed
further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature. In Qualitex, by
contrast, aesthetic functionality was the central question, there having been no indication
that the green-gold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose
of the product or its cost or quality.
145
See Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality
Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. Rev. 243, 326 (2004).
146
Some courts have appeared to ignore TrafFix. See, e.g., Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord
Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We do not understand the Supreme
Court’s decision in TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich analysis.”); EppendorfNetheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2002) (“A design or
characteristic is nonfunctional if there are reasonably effective and efficient alternatives
possible.”).
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the challenges that courts and Congress have had in negotiating
and adapting to current challenges. These challenges can be
summed up as globalization and the expansion of Internet use. By
reflecting on this two-decade time period, I am impressed by the
relatively sensible nature that both the courts and Congress have
taken to reconcile difficult issues. There have been plenty of
judicial bumps in road, and we still need to work out the thorny
issues of dilution law and reconcile the boundaries between
trademark and patent law. Yet on the whole, the journey has been
a laudatory adaptation. I look forward to the next twenty years of
the Fordham Conference in which we will debate the new issues
that await us in the world of trademark law.

